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Abstract 
 
Using a large portfolio of credit card loans observed between 2002 and 2011 provided by a major UK 
bank, we investigate the stability of the parameter estimates of discrete survival models, especially 
since the start of the credit crisis of 2008.  Two survival models are developed for accounts that were 
accepted before and since the crisis.  We find that the two sets of parameter estimates are 
statistically different to each other.  By applying the estimated parameters onto a common test set, 
we also show that they give different predictions of probabilities of default.  The changes in the 
predicted probability distributions are then investigated.  We theorise them to be due to the quality 
of the cohort accepted under different economic conditions, or due to the drastically different 
economic conditions that was seen in the UK economy, or a combination of both.  We test for each 
effect.   
 
 
Keywords: forecasting, robustness and sensitivity analysis, macroeconomic variables, monitoring 
forecasts, structural change, probability forecasting
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1. Introduction 
 
The application of survival analysis models onto credit-related problems is not new (for example, see 
Banasik et al. (1999), Pennington-Cross (2010)) and is welcomed for its ability to take into account 
factors that are inherent in the modelling of credit risk and the prediction of credit events, where 
regression methods are unable to.  First, survival models are able to account for censoring, which 
allows for a realistic and practical model to be developed.  Second, they are able to incorporate 
time-dependent variables with ease, which will allow the inclusion of time-dependent account-
specific covariates as well as time-dependent macroeconomic variables in credit models.  When this 
is combined with simulation, a plausible platform for stress testing is created, as proposed by 
Rodriguez and Trucharte (2007), Leow et al. (2011) and Bellotti and Crook (2013a, 2013b).  Third, 
and most crucially, survival models are able to generate probabilities of how likely an event will 
occur over time, conditional on the event not having occurred before, and this provides a dynamic 
framework for the prediction of credit events (e.g. default or customer churn of credit loans, 
repossession or early-prepayment for mortgage loans).  Because the likelihood of the credit event 
occurring over time can be estimated, the corresponding losses (McDonald et al. (2010)) or profits 
(Ma et al. (2010)) can also be predicted.  In terms of how well survival models predict, there has 
been some work done specifically to compare its prediction to that of regression models: Stepanova 
and Thomas (2002) looked at the model performances in the prediction of early prepayment and 
default of personal loans; Bellotti and Crook (2009) looked at model performances in the prediction 
of default of credit card loans.  Both papers found that survival models are able to predict better 
than static regression models. 
 
This work does not attempt to revisit the advantages of survival models over their regression 
counterparts – that much has been established in the literature over different retail products.  The 
work here differs from the existing literature in two ways.  First, we have a rich source of credit card 
loan data that goes from 2002 to 2011, and so encompasses the credit crisis from 2008, which is not 
commonly available.  Macroeconomic indicators over time will show a large difference in values, and 
it would be interesting to explore how these large and unexpected changes would affect default 
models and their predictions.  Second, we investigate the stability of survival model parameter 
estimates before and after the credit crisis.  Using a portfolio of active credit cards observed 
between January 2002 and March 2011, we investigate whether parameter estimates change over 
the crisis period, and whether the inclusion of time-varying covariates representing the economy are 
able to adequately account for changes to debtors propensity to default.  By separately and 
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independently estimating a survival model for periods before and since the start of the credit crisis, 
i.e. 2002 to 2007 and 2008 to 2011 respectively, we use the Chow Test (more details in Section 4.1) 
to check for statistical differences between the two sets of parameter estimates.  To illustrate how 
the two sets of parameter estimates are different, we apply each survival model developed onto a 
common test set to get the average predicted probabilities over the (duration) time of the loan. 
 
During the course of this work, population drift, and how it might affect parameter estimates, is also 
considered as a related issue, due to the differing types of debtors securing credit accounts before 
and during the credit crisis.  However, because of the large variations in macroeconomic conditions 
that was seen in our period of interest, it is also possible that changes in distributions of probabilities 
are due to the changes in these macroeconomic variables.  We investigate the effects of either by 
selecting two cohorts, representing a set of accounts accepted during a non-downturn period and a 
downturn period, and estimating a survival model for each period.  We then create test sets based 
on each training set, by holding constant either the cohort quality or the macroeconomic conditions, 
and compare the distribution of predicted probabilities to see how the distributions shift due to 
changes in cohort quality or economic conditions. We find macroeconomic conditions do affect 
probabilities of default, and could affect different groups of debtors in different ways. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
We use data gathered at regular, discrete monthly points in time, and the default event is recorded  
in a particular month with reference to the month the account was open. Therefore we estimate the 
survival models in discrete time.  Another advantage of discrete time rather than continuous time 
survival models is a much lower computational time in model estimation. This is important because 
we deal with a large dataset.   
 
Let τiP  be the probability that an individual account i goes into default at duration time (of loan) τ , 
given that default has not happened up to time 1−τ , and the final model developed is given in 
Equation 1. 
( ) ( )153415333211log −−−−− −+−+++=






− τττττττ
τ ββββα ZZXZZYX iii
i
i
P
P
 (1) 
where τα  represents the effect of time on the odds of default; iX  is a vector which represents the 
time-independent, account-dependent covariates, i.e. application variables; 3−τiY  is a vector which 
represents time- and account-dependent covariates, i.e. behavioural variables, lagged 3 months; 
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153 −− − ττ ZZ  is a vector which represents time-dependent, account-independent covariates, i.e. 
macroeconomic variables, at 12th difference and lagged 3 months; and ( )153 −− − ττ ZZX i  is a vector 
which represents interaction terms between selected application variables and macroeconomic 
variables at 12th difference and lagged 3 months. 
 
In this regression model, the dependence of the hazard on time, tα , is specified as 
( )243221 lnln τατατατα +++ .  By doing so, we allow the relationship between effect on time and 
the odds of default to be very flexible with an added advantage of allowing for prediction beyond 
the maximum duration time that is observed in the training set. 
 
A number of model variations were considered in the course of this work, mainly experimenting with 
the way the macroeconomic variables were included in the model.  Lags of between 3 and 12 
months were considered, and to address the possible correlation between macroeconomic 
variables, both levels and 12th differences, lagged or otherwise, of each macroeconomic variable 
were examined.   
 
3. Data 
 
The data is supplied by a major UK bank and is a random sample of credit cards that were issued in 
the UK between 2002 and 2010.  It consists of almost 538,000 unique credit card accounts and each 
account is tracked monthly up to March 2011, or until the time the credit card account is closed, 
whichever is earlier.  Common application variables are available: type of employment, length of 
time the debtor has been with the bank, income at application and age at application, among others.  
Because each account is updated monthly, we also have behavioural variables, including repayment 
amount, credit limit and outstanding balance, from which further behavioural indicators could be 
inferred, for example, how frequently the account misses payment(s) over its entire history.  Any 
behavioural variables included in the model are lagged by 3 months. 
 
Although default information is available from the dataset, it is not consistently defined across the 
entire dataset.  Therefore, a monthly minimum repayment amount is defined and is used to define 
arrears and default.  This minimum repayment amount is 2.5% of the previous month’s outstanding 
balance or £5, whichever is higher, unless the account is in credit, in which case the minimum 
repayment amount is £0, or the account has an outstanding balance of less than £5, in which case 
the minimum repayment amount would be the full outstanding amount.  An account is said to be in 
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arrears if it does not make the minimum payment.  A default is said to occur if and when an account 
goes three months in arrears (not necessarily consecutive).  Note that this definition of default is not 
the conventional “three consecutive months of missed payment”, but is acceptable as financial 
institutions are not bound to this definition of default (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2004), Paragraphs 452-456).  As the work here only focuses on the default event, we do not specify 
the transitions between states of arrears in the preceding months; further details can be found in 
Leow and Crook (2014).  
 
2.1. Training and test set splits 
 
The dataset is used in a number of ways here.  In order to accommodate the lagged behavioural 
covariates, only accounts that are observed for longer than three months since each was opened are 
included. 
 
First, the dataset is split into two training sets (see Table 1).  The first consists of accounts that 
started between January 2002 and December 2007 inclusive, with an observation period up to 
December 2007, i.e. any remaining active accounts are censored in December 2007. The second 
consists of accounts that started between January 2008 and July 2010 inclusive, with an observation 
period up to March 2011, i.e. accounts are censored in March 2011, if the account has not been 
closed earlier.  Note that the two training sets are completely separate.  The creation of these two 
training sets represent portfolios of loans that were accepted before and during the credit crisis, 
since we expect bank policies and acceptance decisions to change slightly over the years, with 
distinguished differences before and since the start of the credit crisis.   
 
Table 1: Dataset splits 
Dataset Acceptance period Observation period 
Training set I January 2002 to August 2007 May 2002 to December 2007 
Training set II January 2008  to July 2010 May 2008 to March 2011 
Combined / “Test” January 2002 to July 2010 May 2002 to March 2011 
 
Due to the split of the training sets, it is not sensible to try and reduce the length of either training 
set further to get a test set.  In order to get an indication of how similar (or different) the models of 
each training set would predict, we apply the respective models onto the entire dataset, i.e. 
combining training sets I and II, as a test set.  Doing so would mean that a common test set is used 
without any further loss to both training sets in terms of observations and observation period.   
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2.2. Macroeconomic variables  
 
The macroeconomic variables considered are given in Table 2.  The main source of macroeconomic 
variables is the Office of National Statistics (ONS), supplemented by data from Bank of England 
(BOE), Nationwide and the European Commission (EC) where appropriate.  The non-seasonally 
adjusted series is selected unless unavailable because the default indicator is not seasonally 
adjusted.  Based on commentary from key industry contacts, UK banks increase their market share 
by lowering cut-off thresholds on application scorecards and extending credit for current borrowers, 
so this is taken into account with the inclusion of total consumer credit outstanding.  In order to 
reduce the impact of trends, the macroeconomic variables are included in the model as its 12th 
difference, lagged 3 months.  Interaction terms between selected macroeconomic variables and 
application variables are also considered.   
 
Table 2: Table of macroeconomic variables  
Variable Source Description 
AWEN ONS Average earnings index, including bonus, including arrears, whole economy, 
not seasonally adjusted 
CIRN BOE Monthly weighted average of UK financial institutions’ interest rate for credit 
card loans to households, not seasonally adjusted 
CLMN ONS Claimant count rate, UK, percentage, not seasonally adjusted  
CONS EC Total consumer confidence indicator, UK, seasonally adjusted  
HPIS Nationwide All houses, seasonally adjusted 
IOPN ONS Index of production, all production industries, not seasonally adjusted 
IRMA BOE Monthly average of Bank of England’s base rate  
LAMN ONS Log (base e) of total consumer credit, amounts outstanding, not seasonally 
adjusted  
LFTN ONS Log (base e) of FTSE all share price index, month end, not seasonally adjusted 
MIRN BOE Monthly weighted average of UK financial institutions’ interest rate for loans 
secured on dwellings to households, not seasonally adjusted 
RPIN ONS All items retail price index, not seasonally adjusted 
UERS ONS Labour Force Survey unemployment rate, UK, all, ages 16 and over, 
percentages, seasonally adjusted 
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4. Results  
 
4.1. Parameter estimates  
 
The parameter estimates from training sets I and II representing accounts that were accepted before 
the crisis and since the crisis started respectively, are given in Table 3  Due to confidentiality 
agreements, we are unable to detail all variables used in the model. 
 
Table 3: Parameter estimates for PD model for accounts accepted pre-crisis and after the crisis 
started.   
Code Variable PRE-CRISIS CRISIS 
    Estimate p < 
0.05 
p < 
0.01 
Estimate p < 
0.05 
p < 
0.01 
Intercept   -3.9076    ** -27.4414    ** 
Application variables  
NOCards Number of cards 0.0341  ** 0.0805  ** 
INC_L Income, ln -0.4172  ** -0.0836  ** 
INC_M0 Income, missing or 0 -4.0706  ** -0.4216  ** 
ageapp_1  Age group 1        
ageapp_2 Age group 2 0.0071   -0.0668  ** 
ageapp_3 Age group 3 0.0231   -0.0700  ** 
ageapp_4 Age group 4 0.0304   -0.0515    
ageapp_5 Age group 5 0.0271   -0.1126  ** 
ageapp_6 Age group 6 -0.0438 *  -0.1622  ** 
ageapp_7 Age group 7 -0.0693  ** -0.2637  ** 
ageapp_8 Age group 8 -0.0287   -0.3339  ** 
ageapp_9 Age group 9 -0.3979  ** -0.3823  ** 
ageapp_10 Age group 10 -0.4241  ** -0.6817  ** 
X_A Variable X, group A        
X_B Variable X, group B 0.1830  ** -0.0693 *   
X_C Variable X, group C 0.1524  ** -0.0502  ** 
X_D Variable X, group D 0.0219   -0.1117  ** 
X_E Variable X, group E 0.0370  ** -0.1643  ** 
ECode_A Employment code group A        
ECode_B Employment code group B -0.0303 *  -0.0122    
ECode_C Employment code group C -0.0112   -0.1468    
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ECode_D Employment code group D 0.1945 *  0.0806    
ECode_E Employment code group E 0.1434   ** 0.2490   ** 
Behavioural variables, lagged 3 months 
LPAY_lag3 Repayment amount, ln -0.1053  ** -0.1161  ** 
LCRL_lag3 Credit limit, ln, 0.5198  ** 0.5770  ** 
PARR_lag3 Proportion of months in 
arrears 
2.2486  ** 2.1021  ** 
PRDR_lag3 Proportion of credit drawn 3.6999   ** 4.2920   ** 
Macroeconomic variables, differenced 12 months, lagged 3 months 
CIRN_d12_lag3m Credit card interest rate -0.1714  ** 0.0267    
RPIN_d12_lag3m Retail price index 0.1228  ** -0.0061    
AWEN_d12_lag3m Average wage earnings -0.2911  ** -0.0322    
LFTN_d12_lag3m FTSE Index, ln 3.8616  ** -0.3210  ** 
UERS_d12_lag3m Unemployment rate -0.3190  ** -0.0182    
IOPN_d12_lag3m Index of production -0.0008   -0.0003    
HPIS_d12_lag3m House price index 0.0026  ** 0.0114  ** 
CONS_d12_lag3m Consumer confidence -0.0452  ** -0.0080  ** 
LAMN_d12_lag3m Total credit outstanding, ln 3.4840   ** 5.7486   ** 
Interaction terms 
INCL_RPd3 Income, ln * Retail price index 0.0056   -0.0030  ** 
INCL_AWd3 Income, ln * Average wage 
earnings 
0.0238  ** 0.0033    
INCM_RPd3 Income, missing * Retail price 
index 
0.0695   -0.0211    
INCM_AWd3 Income, missing * Average 
wage earnings 
0.2746  ** 0.0159    
AAP8_CId3 Age group 8 * Credit card 
interest rate 
-0.0260   0.0018    
AAP8_AWd3 Age group 8 * Average wage 
earnings 
-0.0216   0.0038    
AAP9_CId3 Age group 9 * Credit card 
interest rate 
0.0072   -0.2876    
AAP9_AWd3 Age group 9 * Average wage 
earnings 
0.0184   0.0014    
AAP10_CId3 Age group 10 * Credit card 
interest rate 
-0.0232   -0.1651    
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AAP10_AWd3 Age group 10 * Average wage 
earnings 
-0.0084   0.0080    
ECC_CId3 Employment group C * Credit 
card interest rate 
-0.0305   -0.0602    
ECC_RPd3 Employment group C * Retail 
price index 
-0.0017   0.0171  ** 
ECD_CId3 Employment group D * Credit 
card interest rate 
0.0548   0.3505  ** 
ECD_RPd3 Employment group D * Retail 
price index 
0.0004     0.0127 *   
Variables for dependence of hazard on time 
ctime calendar time (in months, 
referenced from December 
2000) 
0.0017   0.0167  ** 
t duration time 0.1518  ** 3.0308  ** 
tsq duration time, squared -0.0013  ** -0.0248  ** 
lnt duration time, ln -1.8893  ** 17.1773  ** 
lntsq duration time, ln, squared -0.0894   -9.6266   ** 
The single asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) represent variables that are statistically significant at the 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, i.e. * p < 0.05 and ** p < 0.01. 
 
The application variables are fairly stable, with most of the younger borrowers not significantly 
different from each other before the crisis, but becoming significant since the crisis.  Variable X is an 
interesting categorical variable which has its sign changed before and during the crisis period.  
Employment status of the borrower does not seem to have much effect on default probability.  The 
parameters on the behavioural variables are very stable, with very similar estimates over the two 
models.  On the other hand, the parameters on the macroeconomic variables are not, and vary in 
terms of statistical insignificance over the two periods, as well as in terms of parameter estimates 
signs.  Given the instability of these macroeconomic variables, it is not surprising to see that most of 
the interaction terms are statistically insignificant.  Based on information from key industry contacts, 
we know the credit cards portfolio experienced a macroeconomic downturn  two to three years 
earlier than that of the credit crisis (c.f. Figure A1 in the Appendix), and this would not be reflected 
in the significance of general macroeconomic variables.  However, perhaps due to the way the 
training sets were defined, this effect is not obviously captured by the covariates that were used in 
the model.  Although it is possible to try and include more economic variables that are relevant to 
the  type of loan here, e.g. economic indicators on a household level or retail loans write off rates, 
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most of these variables are either not available for as far back as our dataset period, or are only 
available on an annual basis. 
 
4.2. Chow test   
 
The Chow Test is a test of equality between parameter estimates of two linear regression models 
developed on different datasets, first developed by Chow (1960).  An equivalent test for use in 
logistic regression models is the Chow Test Analogue, given in DeMaris (2004).  Logistic regression 
models are each developed for training sets I and II, and the combined dataset, given in Equations 2 
to 4.   
 
( ) ( )1241233211log:combined −−− −+−+++=






ττττττ
τ
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i
i
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P
 (2) 
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
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The null hypothesis states that the parameter estimates from training sets I and II are equal, i.e. 
332211 ,, ςγςγςγ === .  For two groups, the test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution, with 
degrees of freedom calculated to be the total number of parameters in the models of training sets I 
and II less the number of parameters in the combined dataset, given in Equation 5.   
 
( )[ ]212 ln2ln2ln2 LLLc −+−−−=χ      (5) 
where cLln2− , 1ln2 L− , 2ln2 L−  are the fitted log-likelihood of the combined model and models 
from training sets I and II respectively.   
 
The results1 reject the null hypothesis, i.e. the parameter estimates of models developed on training 
sets I and II are statistically significantly different from each other.   
 
                                               
1 Besides performing the Chow Test on the final model, we also repeat the test for two other models: without 
interactions terms and behavioural variables, and without interactions terms.  All three test statistics indicate 
that the parameter estimates from the two training sets are significantly different. 
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We also look at the predicted probabilities of default as predicted by the two models.  By applying 
the parameter estimates onto the test set, predicted probabilities of default for each discrete time 
point of each account can be calculated.  The predicted probability of default at each time point is 
then calculated to be the mean probability of default for all accounts that are at risk of default at 
that time, given in Equation 6.      
 
∑
∑
∈
∈=
τ
τ
τ
τ
Rj
j
Rj
j
n
p
Dˆ       (6) 
where τR  denotes the risk set, i.e. all active accounts, at time τ , and 1=jn  if account τRj∈ , 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
Figure 1: Predicted and observed default rates for combined test set.  The solid dots represent the 
observed default rate; the asterisks represent the predicted default rate from the model developed 
on training set I, i.e. pre-2008; the squares represent the predicted default rate from model 
developed on training set II, i.e. 2008 and onwards.  Due to confidentiality issues, the values of the 
vertical axis are omitted. 
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The predicted probability of default from the models based on training sets I and II are applied onto 
the test set to see how the predictions differ.  Together with the observed default rate from the test 
set, all three are plotted on the same graph, given in Figure 1.  We note that although there are 
potentially, two very different models within the period of the test set, we are not comparing how 
well each model predicts, but how differently the two models predict for each other.  An alternative 
would be to have two separate test sets for each training period, but that would not provide the 
same level of comparison which is achieved here. 
 
The differences between the two predicted hazard rate plots in Figure 1 are due to parameterising 
the same model specification using two different training sets; the test set is the same.  In other 
words the differences are due to differences in the estimated parameters between the two training 
periods: pre- and post- crisis. We see that the model based on pre-crisis accounts significantly under-
estimate default rates in the first 12 months of a loan but estimates well for the rest of the loan, 
while the model based on crisis accounts slightly over-estimates default rates in the first 30 months 
of the loan and under-estimate default rates after that.  
 
4.4 Hazard Distributions 
 
We now investigate the sources of changes in the distributions of hazard rates before and after the 
crisis.  The models that have been estimated using training data are equations 3 and 4.  Simplifying, 
these may be represented as equations 7 and 8 as follows: 
 
lti
T
clt
T
bi
T
aity −− ∆+∆+= 11211112111 zxzβxβ βˆˆˆˆ     (7) 
lti
T
clt
T
bi
T
aity −− ∆+∆+= 21222212222 zxzβxβ βˆˆˆˆ     (8) 
where ity denotes the logit of the hazard probabilities, )( 21 ii xx denotes the vector of application 
variables for individuals i from period 1 (2), that is in the pre- (post-) crisis period and lt−,1z  ( lt−,2z ) 
denotes the vector of macroeconomic variables measured in period 1 (2) respectively, lagged l 
months.  )( 21 ββ represent the vector of parameters cba 111 βββ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ ( cba 222 βββ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ )that have been 
estimated using period 1 (2) data. 
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Table 4: Training sets and created test sets, and their corresponding statistics.   
Acceptance 
Policy 
Training set  Parameters Test sets 
  
    A  B  C   D 
Normal cohort 
2002-2004 
(X1) 
β1 
cohort 
2002-2004 
(X1) 
 
cohort 
2008-2010 
(X2) 
 
cohort 
2002-2004 
(X1) 
 
cohort 
2008-2010 
(X2) 
 macro 
2002-2005 
(∆Z1) macro 
2008-2011 
(∆Z2) 
 
macro 
2002-2005 
(∆Z1) 
 
macro 
2002-2005 
(∆Z1) 
 
macro 
2008-2011 
(∆Z2) 
    ND D ND D ND D ND D 
   mean 0.1975 0.2047  0.0011 0.0012  0.1173 0.1696  0.0112 0.0098 
   standard 
deviation 
0.2970 0.3166  0.0014 0.0014  0.0807 0.0925  0.0272 0.0208 
   median 0.0131 0.0049  0.0008 0.0009  0.0975 0.1556  0.0032 0.0024 
   mode 0.0002 0.0002  0.0007 0.0007  0.2054 0.2054  0.0057 0.0057 
    E  F  G  H 
Downturn cohort 
2008-2010 
(X2) 
β2 
cohort 
2008-2010 
(X2) 
 
cohort 
2002-2004 
(X1) 
 
cohort 
2008-2010 
(X2) 
 
cohort 
2002-2004 
(X1) 
 macro 
2008-2011 
(∆Z2) macro 
2002-2005 
(∆Z1) 
 
macro 
2008-2011 
(∆Z2) 
 
macro 
2008-2011 
(∆Z2) 
 
macro 
2002-2005 
(∆Z1) 
    ND D ND D ND D ND D 
   mean 0.3421 0.4033  0.1116 0.1183  0.1132 0.1350  0.3427 0.3532 
   standard 
deviation 
0.1598 0.1483  0.0518 0.0502  0.0572 0.0527  0.1420 0.1203 
   median 0.3415 0.3906  0.1089 0.1130  0.1127 0.1271  0.3375 0.3404 
   mode 0.3204 0.3204  0.0941 0.0941  0.0899 0.0899  0.2753 0.2753 
“ND” refers to non-default accounts, “D” refers to default accounts.  
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It can now be seen that there are at least three sources of differences between the distributions of 
hazards before and after the crisis.  These are differences in the estimated parameters, differences 
in the distributions of the application variables (X values) and differences in the distributions of the 
macroeconomic variables (Z values).  To isolate the effects of each we hold two constant and vary 
the third, for each source, in turn.  Note that for these predictions we omitted the behavioural 
variables as we are not able to predict how these variables would react to the changes in 
macroeconomic variables.  The interaction terms are also updated with the changed macroeconomic 
conditions correspondingly.  
 
The specific set-up is shown in Table 4.  In the top panel, the model is estimated using cohort 2002-
2004 as the training sample yielding parameters denoted by 1β .  This cohort was accepted under a 
‘non-crisis’,  that is normal conditions, cut-off rule.  In the lower panel the model is estimated using 
cohort 2008-2010 as the training sample yielding parameters denoted by 2β .  This cohort was 
accepted during the crisis period,  that is 2008-2010. These identifiers are given in columns 1 and 2.  
The remaining columns identify the combinations of the application and macroeconomic variables 
that are used to yield predicted hazard rates in the test sets.  For example, test set A refers to an 
out-of-sample test set with values of application variables measured in 2002-2004 (X1) and values of 
macroeconomic variables taken during 2008-2011 (∆Z2), scored using the 1β  values; test set E 
predictions are made using the 2β  parameter values, values of application variables for the cohort 
2008-2010 (X2) and values of macroeconomic variables for 2002-2005 (∆Z1).  Immediately below 
each test set are some statistics based on the predicted probabilities, further segmented by defaults 
(D) and non-defaults (ND).  The remaining cells are to be interpreted similarly.  Since the 
distributions of the hazards are skewed we concentrate on the differences in the median and modal 
values so of the distributions2.  Table 5 summarises the results. 
 
First, we examine the effects of differences in the training cohorts holding the application and 
macroeconomics conditions constant.  Four comparisons are possible since we have two possible 
values for the application variables and two possible values for the macroeconomic conditions (see 
Panel A of Table 5).  A comparison of the distributions generated by values in test sets A (pre-crisis) 
and F (post-crisis) isolate the effects of the parameter differences between the crisis and non-crisis 
periods by holding the X values at the 2002-2004 values and the Z values at 2008-2011 values.  It can 
be seen that the changes in the parameters from the pre to the post-crisis periods led to an increase 
                                               
2 Due to the number of comparisons we are making in this work and the similarities of the graphs, we have 
chosen not to include the graphs of distributions of each pair-wise comparison.  
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in the median and modal hazards for both the non-default cases and the default cases.  The spread, 
measured by the standard deviation, decreased.  If we compare test sets B (pre-crisis) and E (post 
crisis) we see the effects of changes in the parameters holding X at the 2008-2010 values and the Z 
at the 2002-2005 values.  Again the median and modal values of the hazards increased after the 
crisis, but the spread actually increased. Comparing C with H fixes the application and the 
macroeconomic variables values at the pre-crisis levels and again moving from the pre- to the post-
crisis models results in increases in the median and modal values of the hazards.  The comparison D 
with G shows the same qualitative results.  In conclusion, the parameters of survival models of 
default changed between the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods, where the model developed 
using downturn data ( 2β ) consistently gives higher predictions of hazards across different 
macroeconomic conditions or cohorts.  It would seem that hazards from 1β  are under-estimated, 
but it is not clear whether the predicted hazards from 2β have compensated enough.      
 
Next, we examine the effects of changes in the distributions of the application characteristics of 
credit card holders on predicted hazards.  Again four comparisons are possible: test sets A with D, C 
with B, and also F with G and E with H (see Panel B of Table 5).  If we compare test sets A and D, both 
test sets have the same parameter values ( 1β )  and both have the same values of the 
macroeconomic variables (2008-2011), so the differences in predicted hazards are due to differences 
in the application variables (X).  The results show that moving from the pre- to the post-crisis values 
the median (and the mean) of the hazard rates decreased considerably for the default and non-
default samples whilst the mode actually increased for both groups.  The spreads also fell. 
Comparing test sets C and B, we again condition on 1β but now fix the fix the macroeconomic 
variables at pre-crisis levels (2002-2005).  Moving from the pre- to the post-crisis cohorts, the 
median and the modal hazards both fell.  We also make the comparisons by fixing the model to be 
the post-crisis model ( 2β ) by comparing test sets F and G.  Now conditioning on the parameters 
gained from the crisis cohort and moving from the pre- to the post-crisis cohorts, we see only very 
slight changes in all values of mean, median, mode and spread.  This is the same case when we 
compare test sets E and H.  In conclusion, the effects of changes in cohorts in the test set depend on 
the cohort used to train the model.  Assuming the bank does become more stringent with its 
acceptance policy since the crisis, it is likely that the post-crisis cohort is less risky, which  the model 
developed on non-downturn data ( 1β ) is suggesting.  However, the model developed on downturn 
data ( 2β ) is not able to differentiate between cohorts even when macroeconomic conditions are 
held constant.   
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Table 5: Comparisons of test sets 
Test set 
comparisons 
Holding constant (test 
set characteristics) 
Change from 
pre-crisis 
Change to 
post-crisis 
Change (in 
median) 
Possible 
Interpretations 
PANEL A: Change in parameter estimates 
C vs H macro effect (∆Z1), 
cohort effect (X1) 
β1 β2 increase in 
hazards 
β2 consistently gives 
higher predicted 
hazards across 
different 
macroeconomic 
conditions and 
cohorts  
B vs E macro effect (∆Z1), 
cohort effect (X2) 
β1 β2 increase in 
hazards 
A vs F macro effect (∆Z2), 
cohort effect (X1) 
β1 β2 increase in 
hazards 
D vs G macro effect (∆Z2), 
cohort effect (X2) 
β1 β2 increase in 
hazards 
PANEL B: Change in cohort 
C vs B parameters (β1),  
macro effect (∆Z1) 
X1 X2 decrease in 
hazards 
β1 gives lower 
predictions of hazards 
when the cohort 
changes  
A vs D parameters (β1),  
macro effect (∆Z2) 
X1 X2 decrease in 
hazards 
E vs H parameters (β2),  
macro effect (∆Z1) 
X1 X2 almost no 
change 
β2 is not able to 
differentiate between 
cohorts even when 
macroeconomic 
conditions are held 
constant  
F vs G parameters (β2), 
 macro effect (∆Z2) 
X1 X2 almost no 
change 
PANEL C: Change in macroeconomic conditions 
C vs A parameters (β1),  
cohort effect (X1) 
∆Z1 ∆Z2 decrease in 
hazards 
β1 gives conflicting 
trends depending on 
the cohort tested  B vs D parameters (β1),  
cohort effect (X2) 
∆Z1 ∆Z2 increase in 
hazards 
H vs F parameters (β2),  
cohort effect (X1) 
∆Z1 ∆Z2 decrease in 
hazards 
β2 gives lower 
predictions of hazards 
when macroeconomic 
conditions changes   
E vs G parameters (β2),  
cohort effect (X2) 
∆Z1 ∆Z2 decrease in 
hazards 
 
Finally, we compare the effects of changes in the macroeconomic conditions holding the training 
model and the application variables constant.  This can be done for the pre-crisis model ( 1β ) by 
comparing test sets C and A  and B with D and when using the post-crisis model ( 2β ) by comparing H 
with F and E with G (see Panel C of Table 5).  Holding the application variables at their pre-crisis 
values and comparing C with A, we see that moving from the pre- to the post-crisis test sets, the 
median and the modal values both decreased.  Holding the application values at their post-crisis 
levels, comparing B with D, we see that moving from the pre- to the post-crisis conditions led to an 
increase in median and modal hazards.  Now we make similar comparisons for the post-crisis model 
( 2β ).  We see that moving from the pre-crisis conditions to the crisis conditions decreases the 
median and modal hazards whether we condition on pre-crisis characteristics (test sets H and F) or 
post-crisis characteristics (test sets E and G).  In conclusion, the model based on non-downturn data 
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( 1β ) gives conflicting trends in predicted hazards depending on the cohort tested; whilst the model 
based on downturn data ( 2β ) estimates a large and obvious drop in predicted hazards when post-
crisis macroeconomic conditions are used.  Both observations imply that the parameter estimates of 
the two survival models are not able to adequately take into account macroeconomic effects such 
that when these change (in the test sets) significantly from what were observed (in the training set), 
they give very different hazard estimates, and this could be further complicated by changes in the 
cohort.     
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
This work investigates the stability of parameter estimates of discrete survival models developed on 
a large portfolio of credit card loans provided by a major UK bank, consisting of accounts that were 
accepted between 2002 and 2010, and observed up to early 2011.  By developing two survival 
models, one based on data from before the crisis and the other based on data from since the crisis 
started, we use the chow test, a statistical test to test for differences between two sets of parameter 
estimates, and show that there are statistically significant differences between the two sets of 
estimated parameters, leading to different distributions of predicted probabilities of default.  We 
also apply the estimated parameters onto a common test set to show how each set of parameters 
would give different predictions for probabilities of the default, and find that the models 
underestimate and overestimate default rates at different duration times of the loan.   
 
We then investigated the three possible sources leading to the change in the distributions of hazards 
before and after the crisis: the difference in the quality of the cohort accepted under different 
economic conditions, the drastically different economic conditions that were seen in the UK 
economy, or the different estimated parameters.  This was done by selecting two cohorts, one 
representing a cohort of loans accepted during a non-downturn period (i.e. loans that were accepted 
during 2002 to 2004, observed up to 2005 under 2002 to 2005 macroeconomic conditions), and the 
other representing loans that were accepted during the downturn period (i.e. loans that were 
accepted during 2008 to 2010, observed up to 2011, under 2008 to 2011 macroeconomic 
conditions), and estimating two survival models for each period separately and independently.  
Based on these two selected cohorts, we then created four related test sets holding constant either 
cohort quality or the economic conditions, and by applying either set of estimated parameters, we 
get 8 different scored test sets, which we then compare pair-wise.   
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We find that changes in cohort, macroeconomic conditions and the estimated parameters all 
contribute towards the change in the distributions of predicted probabilities of default.  Our results 
show that the model developed on downturn data consistently gives higher predicted probabilities 
of default, and this held across different macroeconomic conditions and cohorts, perhaps suggesting 
that using non-downturn data in model development would lead to a falsely optimistic view and 
underestimate probabilities of default.  Depending on whether the model was developed on non-
downturn or downturn data, differences in cohort might or might not be picked up by the estimated 
parameters – our results show that whilst parameter estimates from non-downturn data suggest 
lower hazards for the post-crisis cohort in line with expectations, the parameter estimates from 
downturn data was not able to pick it up.  However, it is the effects of changes in macroeconomic 
conditions that are most difficult to unravel.  Moving from pre- to post-crisis macroeconomic 
conditions, the model developed on non-downturn data predicts that hazards would increase for the 
post-crisis cohort yet decrease for the pre-crisis cohort, suggesting that different macroeconomic 
conditions affect different people at different times differently.  Yet, doing the same comparison 
using a model developed on downturn data, we find a large decrease in estimated hazards.  All these 
imply that even though we have taken into account macroeconomic conditions and possible 
interactions between macroeconomic and application variables, the models are still unable to 
adequately model the various effects coming from type of borrower, the time during which 
borrowing takes place, and how macroeconomic conditions would affect different individuals 
differently. 
 
 There is much further work to be done.  Kelly et al. (1999) theorized that a model which is able to 
take into account all known and unknown predictor variables would be able to adapt to changes in 
the underlying population but that this is not always possible to achieve.  While we have considered 
most major economic indicators (for which data was available), these variables were still unable to 
adequately represent all of the required predictor variables, hence the significantly different 
parameter estimates after the credit crisis.  Further variables that can be considered include random 
variables to account for unknown heterogeneity, perhaps that are either or both of individual-
specific and time-specific.  More work is also required in the exploration and quantification of the 
effects of macroeconomic variation and cohort quality on probabilities of default, as well as the 
other components of risk in the calculation of loss.     
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Figure A1: Total consumer credit amount outstanding, ln, non-seasonally adjusted, 12th differenced. 
 
 
